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Abstract 
The recent problems generated by the economic and financial crisis have led to 
some debate on the role of economic policies. The question is to which extent a specific 
monetary policy regime would impose a restriction to policymakers. In particular, the 
cost of losing independence in the use of the exchange rate and monetary policy, and the 
restrictions derived from the fiscal discipline required for supporting monetary agreements. 
As an example we can think on the expected success of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), related to the benefits of the single currency, the higher 
degree of integration of financial markets, and also to the sound public finances 
guaranteed by the set of fiscal rules provided by EMU. When signing the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), Member States committed themselves to reach a medium-term 
budgetary position close to balance. The Maastricht Treaty stresses as basic that the 
Member States of the EMU should avoid excessive deficits, and the reference values for 
deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios have worked in fact as an explicit fiscal rule. 
But, in practice, the policy orientation of the SGP has not been fully satisfied. This has 
opened a debate about the utility and effectiveness of fiscal rules in EMU, and on their 
complementarities with discretionary fiscal policy measures and automatic stabilisers to 
deal with short-run fluctuations. The aim of this paper is to investigate how to deal with 
monetary (financial) shocks in a monetary union following fiscal rules. In particular, we 
will analyse the interaction among those members showing a relatively high level of 
public debt and those that seem to follow a more strict fiscal discipline. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial crisis is considered to be the worst crisis since the Great Depression 
of the 1930s. After the collapse of financial institutions there has been a decline in 
economic activity and an increase of unemployment that have contributed to a global 
economic recession. There are several explanations for such a big crisis (see Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2009) for a survey of financial crises), but there is no consensus about how 
it could be avoided. 
The macroeconomic problems generated by the economic and financial crisis 
have led to some debate on the role of economic policies. But most of macroeconomic 
models do not seem to capture specifically the role of financial markets. As far as we 
know a financial crisis is generally modelled as a monetary negative shock, and 
theoretical findings reveal that the effects of the monetary (financial) shocks depend on 
the international linkages and channels of transmission of monetary policy, which are 
related to the particular exchange rate regime (see Díaz-Roldán (2004), for example).  
Regarding exchange rate regimes, recent experiences (such as the speculative 
attacks on currencies in the European Monetary System in 1992-1993, the default on 
Mexican debt in 1994, the devaluations and the banking crises across Asia in 1997-
1998, the Argentine crises in 2001 and the financial crisis of 2007... followed by a 
global recession) have shown the increasing difficulty for a country to build the 
reputation needed to sustain a fixed exchange rate system. The ultimate reason is the 
spectacular growth of world capital markets, following the continuous liberalization and 
deregulation of capital movements that occurred in last years. So, if a government’s 
compromise of maintaining a certain exchange rate is not believed as credible by 
financial markets, huge speculative attacks at such a massive scale would occur. All this 
has led to some authors (e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) to suggest that, in the near 
future, the choice faced by a country would be either maintaining a flexible exchange 
rate or adopting a common currency, rather than a fixed exchange rate, with other 
related countries. Moreover, from a macroeconomic point of view it is clear that a 
system of fixed exchange rates (and full capital mobility) implies that there is only one 
system-wide monetary policy. National currencies would become perfect substitutes 
through the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates if they became equally appropriate for 
the three classical functions of money, namely: unit of account, store of value and 
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medium of exchange. For those reasons, a monetary union has been suggested as an 
alternative to a system of fixed exchange rates. 
As an example, the expected success of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) was related to the benefits of the single currency, the higher degree of 
integration of financial markets, and also to the sound public finances guaranteed by the 
set of fiscal rules provided by EMU. When signing the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), Member States committed themselves to reach a medium-term budgetary 
position close to balance. The Maastricht Treaty stresses as basic that the Member 
States of the EMU should avoid excessive deficits; and the reference values for deficit-
to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios, have worked in practice as an explicit fiscal rule. But, 
in practice, the policy orientation of the SGP has not been fully satisfied. This has 
opened a debate about the utility and effectiveness of fiscal rules in EMU, and on their 
complementarities with discretionary fiscal policy measures and automatic stabilisers to 
deal with short-run fluctuations. 
There is no a wide literature on fiscal rules. Ballabriga and Martínez-Mongay 
(2003) estimate monetary and fiscal rules for the euro-zone, concluding that monetary 
policy rules are not enough to guarantee price stability, and that they should be 
accompanied by an explicit public deficit objective. Debrun et al. (2008) study the 
relationship between fiscal discipline and fiscal rules in the EU-25, and they found that 
fiscal rules lead to more stable budget policies and less pro-cyclical fiscal policies. 
Brzozowski and Siwińska-Gorzelak (2010) analyse the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal 
policy volatility. From their results they conclude that rules based on deficit control are 
more destabilizing than those based on imposing a limit to public debt. More recently, 
Díaz-Roldán and Montero-Soler (2011) analyse the convenience of using fiscal rules for 
the New Member States (NMS) of the EMU. And they found that the success of fiscal 
policy decisions depend on the symmetric or asymmetric nature of the shocks to deal 
with. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate how to deal with monetary (financial) 
shocks in a monetary union. In particular, we will analyse the interaction among those 
members showing a relatively high level of public debt and those that seem to follow a 
more strict fiscal discipline. We will examine the consequences of monetary (financial) 
shocks when there is a single monetary policy and the domestic authorities are constrained 
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by the fiscal discipline imposed by the monetary agreements of a monetary union 
following an explicit fiscal policy rule. 
The paper is structured as follows: the macroeconomic model is presented in 
section 2; section 3 shows the empirical results; and, finally, section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Macroeconomic Model 
We will follow Díaz-Roldán and Montero-Soler (2009). Our starting point is a 
“small” monetary union formed by two symmetric countries, where nominal exchange 
rate disappears among countries. Variables are defined as logarithmic deviations from 
their equilibrium levels (see Appendix for details). The aggregate demand and the 
aggregate supply functions for each country are as follows: 
112211 vhgcypbpay                            (1) 
221122 vhgcypbpay                            (2) 
111 spty                                                             (3) 
222 spty                                                            (4) 
Equations (1) and (2) represent the aggregate demand function for each member 
country of the monetary union, where y1, y2 are outputs,  p1,  p2, inflation rates, g1, g2 
the budget deficits, i.e., the fiscal policy instrument, and v1, v2 capture any kind of 
expansionary demand shock. Equations (3) and (4) represent the aggregate supply 
function for each member country of the monetary union, where s1, s2 capture any kind 
of contractive supply shock.  
We find that a contractive supply shock (s1, s2 > 0), always leads to a fall in 
output in both countries, while positive demand shocks (v1, v2 > 0) lead to positive 
effects on the output and prices of the country of origin of the shock. But when the 
demand shock is transmitted across the two countries, the sign of the coefficients 
depends on which channel of transmission prevails. 
The channels of transmission of such disturbances are those related with the 
international trade: the aggregate demand, the interest rate, and the real exchange rate 
(i.e., relative prices in monetary unions). When a country’s aggregate demand increases, 
also increases foreign goods’ imports, and the result is the called “locomotive” effect, 
i.e., the effects on the output and prices of the country of origin of the shock are 
transmitted to the other country with the same sign. In our case, we would find an 
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aggregate demand expansion with an output expansion and a rise in prices in the two 
countries. 
Regarding the interest rate, the development and integration of financial markets 
implies that interest rates are determined by world markets. High interest rates attract 
cross-border investments until the equilibrium is reached, but under imperfect capital 
mobility, domestic interest rates will diverge from world interest rates, inducing capital 
inflows or outflows depending on whether they are higher or lower than the world rates. 
When changes in the real exchange rate prevail, the result is the “beggar-thy-
neighbour” effect, i.e., the effects on the output and prices of one country are 
transmitted abroad with the opposite sign. The reason is that a real exchange rate 
depreciation (appreciation) in an economy means an appreciation (depreciation) in the 
other, which leads to an aggregate demand expansion (recession) in that economy, and 
to a recession (expansion) in the other.  
Looking at the coefficients of the equations of the model (see Appendix) the 
“beggar-thy-neighbour” effect prevails when countries are particularly concerned by 
inflation targeting and output stabilization. This would be the case for a monetary union 
following a monetary policy rule. 
 Solving (1) to (4), we obtain the reduced forms:  
y1 = A hg1 + A v1  ± B hg2  ±  B v2  C s1  D s2                  (5) 
y2 = A hg2 + Av2  ±  B hg1  ±   B v1  C s2  D s1                   (6) 
p1 = A’hg1 + A’v1 + B’hg2 + B’v2 + C’s1 + D’s2                (7) 
p2 = A’hg2 + A’v2 + B’hg1 + B’v1 + C’ s2 + D’s1                       (8) 
 
To take into account the role of fiscal rules, we will follow Ballabriga and 
Martínez-Mongay (2003). So, we will consider a fiscal rule which relates an explicit 
public deficit target (in terms of the GDP), go, with public debt deviations (in terms of 
the GDP) respect to its optimal level (d-1 – do), and the output level y: 
 ])([ 1, i
o
ii
o
i yddg             i = 1, 2                (9) 
The public deficit adjusts according to the following path, where 10  : 
1,)1(  i
o
ii ggg                   (10) 
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Adding together the variables that are given in period 1, we obtain the simplified fiscal 
rules for each member country of the union: 
111 ykg            (11) 
222 ykg           (12) 
Notice that if )( 1,
o
ii dd  > 0, then ki < 0, indicating a country with a relatively 
high level of debt. And the opposite holds for ki > 0, indicating a country with a 
relatively low level of debt. 
 We will assume that fiscal authorities will try to minimize their loss function 
constrained by the economic framework (given by the reduced form of the 
macroeconomic model), and the explicit fiscal rule. Their goals are to minimize output 
changes, with stabilization purposes, and to minimize public deficit changes, in order to 
achieve fiscal discipline. Regarding inflation, since our model describes a monetary 
union, we assume full delegation of prices control to the monetary authority; therefore, 
public deficit will be the only policy instrument available.   
In this framework, the set of policy makers decisions are the following: (i) 
Independent decision and no fiscal rule in any country, (ii) Coordinated decision and no 
fiscal rule in any country, (iii) Independent decision and fiscal rule in both countries, 
(iv) Coordinated decision and fiscal rule in both countries, and (v) Coordinated decision 
and fiscal rule only in one country. Notice we are assuming that coordination (the 
cooperative symmetric solution) means to implement an identical policy response. 
The most interesting is case (v), because (i) to (iv) result trivial. For the case of 
no country adopting fiscal rules (or the adoption of fiscal rules in both countries), 
cooperation would not the best solution when the shocks have asymmetric effects on the 
output. The reason is that when facing shocks, leading to different effects the best 
policy response would be using different fiscal policies. When both countries adopt a 
fiscal rule, the results differ from the case with no fiscal rules only in the size of the 
coefficients: graphically it is just a change of scale. 
Next we show the optimization problems. Solving them, we will obtain the set of 
optimal (fiscal) policies, i.e., the optimal level of public deficit (see Appendix for 
details). 
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(i) Independent decision and no fiscal rule in any country 
22min iii
ig
gyL   
s.t. yi = yi (…)  i = 1,2. 
where 2,122  igyL iii   is the loss function of the fiscal authority. In 
order to describe the concern on deficit control, we assume  > 1.  
 Solution (see Appendix): 241322111 sGsGvGvGg
NNNNN     
 
(ii) Coordinated decision and no fiscal rule in any country 




 21
2,1 2
1
2
1min LL
gg
  
s.t. y1 = y1 (…) 
      y2 = y2 (…) 
Solution (see Appendix): 241322111 sGsGvGvGg
CCCCC         
 
(iii) Independent decision and fiscal rule in both countries 
22min iii
ig
gyL   
s.t. yi = yi (…) 
     gi = gi (…)    i = 1,2. 
 Solution (see Appendix): 2
,
41
,
32
,
21
,
1
,
1 sGsGvGvGg
RNRNRNRNRN       
 
(iv) Coordinated decision and fiscal rule in both countries 




 21
2,1 2
1
2
1min LL
gg
  
 s.t. y1 = y1 (…) 
     y2 = y2 (…) 
    g1 = g1 (…) 
    g2 = g2 (…) 
Solution (see Appendix): 2
,
41
,
32
,
21
,
1
,
1 sGsGvGvGg
RCRCRCRCRC       
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(v) Coordinated decision and fiscal rule only in one country, we assume that 
country 1 follows the fiscal rule: 




 21,1 2
1
2
1
min
2
LL
gg
  
s.t.   y1 = y1 (...) 
        y2 = y2 (...) 
              111 ykg   
Solution (see Appendix): Notice we found no symmetric solution. 
2
,
41
,
32
,
21
,
1
,
1 sGsGvGvGg
RCRCRCRCRC                                          
142312212 sGsGvGvGg
CCCCC                                                       
 
Given that fiscal authorities are aimed to minimize public deficit changes, in 
order to achieve fiscal discipline, the best response would be the one showing the 
minimal deviation from the equilibrium level. Since it would be tedious to compare the 
coefficients for each solution, in the next section we will perform an empirical 
application. We will assign numeric values to the coefficients, in order to evaluate the 
loose of adopting the policy responses given by the analytical solutions. 
 
 
3. The costs and benefits of following a fiscal rule 
As we mentioned in the introduction, there is a debate about the utility and 
effectiveness of fiscal rules, and on their complementarities with discretionary fiscal 
policy measures and automatic stabilisers to deal with short-run fluctuations. 
Particularly, in EMU, the Maastricht Treaty stressed as basic that the Member States of 
EMU should avoid excessive deficits; and the reference values for deficit-to-GDP and 
debt-to-GDP ratios, have worked in practice as an explicit fiscal rule. But the success of 
any kind of policy remains an empirical question. 
In Table 1 the government deficit (+)/surplus() and government debt in 
percentage of GDP is shown for the EU-27. In 2010 the government deficit and the 
government debt of EU-27 was 6.6 and 80.1 respectively (both in percentage of the 
GDP)1. These figures are above the 3 and 60 limits required by the Maastricht Treaty. 
Moreover, the recent financial crisis is not a good environment, and contributes to 
                                               
1 Source: Eurostat. 
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create difficulties when deciding how to finance the public deficit. In such a context, the 
scope of fiscal policies in a monetary union seems to be reduced. If we look at the 
figures, 14 of the EU-27 countries show debt figures above 60% (Belgium, Germany, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, The Netherlands, 
Austria, Portugal and United Kingdom). Regarding the deficit ratio, only 5 countries 
(Denmark, Estonia, Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden) show figures below 3%.  
In order to make an empirical application of our theoretical findings, we will 
make the following assumptions. The shocks suffered by the countries are identical in 
size (normalized to 1); in other words, they are perfectly symmetric in size. The shocks 
may differ in the sign: expansive (+) or contractive (); so they are perfectly asymmetric 
in their effects. Next, we will give numerical values to the parameters of the reduced 
form according to the following criteria: In the fiscal rule, the response of the public 
deficit to changes in output will be neutral ( = 0.5) to underline the relevance of the 
debt level: higher than the target (k = 0.9) or lower (k = 0.9). For comparability reasons 
we assign the value 1 to the aggregate supply slope (t = 1), and in the loss function we 
assume that fiscal authorities are more concerned about fiscal discipline, than about 
stability ( = 1.3)2. 
                                               
2 For the rest of the values see Appendix.  
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Table 1 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) and debt in the EU-27 (% of GDP) 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
EU-27      
Deficit/surplus -1.5 -0.9 -2.4 -6.9 -6.6 
Debt 61.5 59 62.5 74.7 80.1 
BELGIUM      
Deficit/surplus 0.1 -0.3 -1.3 -5.8 -4.1 
Debt 88 84.1 89.3 95.9 96.2 
BULGARIA      
Deficit/surplus 1.9 1.2 1.7 -4.3 -3.1 
Debt 21.6 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.3 
CZECH REPUBLIC      
Deficit/surplus -2.4 -0.7 -2.2 -5.8 -4.8 
Debt 28.3 27.9 28.7 34.4 37.6 
DENMARK      
Deficit/surplus 5.2 4.8 3.2 -2.7 -2.6 
Debt 32.1 27.5 34.5 41.8 43.7 
GERMANY      
Deficit/surplus -1.6 0.2 -0.1 -3.2 -4.3 
Debt 68.1   65.2 66.7 74.4 83.2 
ESTONIA      
Deficit/surplus 2.5 2.4 -2.9 -2.0 0.2 
Debt 4.4 3.7 4.5 7.2 6.7 
IRELAND      
Deficit/surplus 2.9 0.1 -7.3 -14.2 -31.3 
Debt 24.7 24.8 44.2 65.2 92.5 
GREECE      
Deficit/surplus -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.8 -10.6 
Debt 106.1 107.4 113 129.3 144.9 
SPAIN      
Deficit/surplus 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.3 
Debt 39.6 36.2 40.1 53.8 61 
FRANCE      
Deficit/surplus -2.3 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 -7.1 
Debt 63.7 64.2 68.2 79 82.3 
ITALY      
Deficit/surplus -3.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.6 
Debt 106.1 103.1 105.8 115.5 118.4 
CYPRUS      
Deficit/surplus -1.2 3.5 0.9 -6.1 -5.3 
Debt 64.7 58.8 48.9 58.5 61.5 
LATVIA      
Deficit/surplus -0.5 -0.4 -4.2 -9.7 -8.3 
Debt 10.7 9 19.8 36.7 44.7 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Government deficit (-)/surplus (+) and debt in the EU-27 (% of GDP) 
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
LITHUANIA      
Deficit/surplus -0.4 -1 -3.3 -9.5 -7 
Debt 17.9 16.8 15.5 29.4 38 
LUXEMBOURG      
Deficit/surplus 1.4 3.7 3 -0.9 -1.1 
Debt 6.7 6.7 13.7 14.8 19.1 
HUNGARY      
Deficit/surplus -9.3 -5.1 -3.7 -4.6 -4.2 
Debt 65.9 67 72.9 79.7 81.3 
MALTA      
Deficit/surplus -2.8 -2.4 -4.6 -3.7 -3.6 
Debt 64.1 62.1 62.2 67.8 69 
NETHERLAND      
Deficit/surplus 0.5 0.2 0.5 -5.6 -5.1 
Debt 47.4 45.3 58.5 60.8 62.9 
AUSTRIA      
Deficit/surplus -1.5 -0.9 -0.9 -4.1 -4.4 
Debt 62.3 60.2 63.8 69.5 71.8 
POLAND      
Deficit/surplus -3.6 -1.9 -3.7 -7.3 -7.8 
Debt 47.7 45 47.1 50.9 54.9 
PORTUGAL      
Deficit/surplus -4.1 -3.1 -3.6 -10.1 -9.8 
Debt 63.9 68.3 71.6 83 93.3 
ROMANIA      
Deficit/surplus -2.2 -2.9 -5.7 -9 -6.9 
Debt 12.4 12.8 13.4 23.6 3.1 
SLOVENIA      
Deficit/surplus -1.4 0.0 -1.9 -6.1 -5.8 
Debt 26.4 23.1 21.9 35.3 38.8 
SLOVAKIA      
Deficit/surplus -3.2 -1.8 -2.1 -8 -7.7 
Debt 30.5 29.6 27.8 35.5 41 
FINLAND      
Deficit/surplus 4.1 5.3 4.3 -2.5 -2.5 
Debt 39.6 35.2 33.9 43.3 48.3 
SWEDEN      
Deficit/surplus 2.3 3.6 2.2 -0.7 0.2 
Debt 45 40.2 38.8 42.7 39.7 
UNITED KINGDOM      
Deficit/surplus -2.7 -2.7 -5 -11.5 -10.3 
Debt 43.4 44.4 54.8 69.6 79.9 
Source: Eurostat 
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According to the loss functions of the optimization problems described in 
section 2, in Table 2 we have computed looses when the countries of the monetary 
union are hit by a common contractive demand shock (v1 < 0 + v2 < 0), leading to 
contractive effects on output (y1=  1.4103, y2=  0.2565) and on inflation (p1=  
1.7317, p2=  1.0372), but different in size.  
 
Table 2 
 
Looses after a common contractive demand shock (v1 < 0 + v2 < 0) 
 
 NO FISCAL 
RULES IN ANY 
COUNTRY 
FISCAL RULES 
IN BOTH 
COUNTRIES 
FISCAL RULE ONLY IN ONE 
COUNTRY (Country 1) 
High debt  k1 < 0 Low debt  k1 > 0 
 
BEGGAR-THY-
NEIGHBOUR 
EFFECT 
L1 = 2.7155 L1 = 2.9522 L1 = 2.0594 L1 = 3.0522 
L2 = 2.0448 L2 = 2.1147 L2 = 0.0643 L2 = 2.1233 
  = 2.0076  = 2.0359   = 2.6688   = 2.0433 
 
LOCOMOTIVE 
EFFECT 
L1 = 2.8646 L1 = 2.9575 L1 = 3.9831 L1 = 3.8749 
L2 = 0.0564 L2 = 0.0483 L2 = 3.4963 L2 = 3.2447 
 = 3.2466   = 3.1298   = 3.2749   = 3.1316 
Note: L1 and L2 are looses when countries act individually (Nash solution). While   indicates  
looses when countries act in a coordinated way (Cooperative solution). In the coloured cases, the 
best response is not to implement an identical fiscal policy. 
 
From figures in Table 2 we can conclude that the best fiscal policy response 
would be: 
● Not cooperate when only those countries having a high debt adopt a 
fiscal rule (but not the rest of the countries), the whole union has suffered a 
common financial shock (losses are larger for the cooperative solution), and the 
beggar-thy-neighbour effect prevails. In that cases, the cooperative solution (  ) 
shows a higher loose than Nash solution (L1 and L2). 
● Not cooperate if none country (or all the countries) have adopted a 
fiscal rule, and the whole union has suffered a common financial shock (losses 
are larger for the cooperative solution), when the locomotive effect prevails. The 
cooperative solution (  ) shows a higher loose than Nash solution (L1 and L2), 
again. 
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4. Summary and conclusions 
In this paper, we have studied the implications of monetary (financial) shocks in 
monetary unions under different fiscal policy regimes. In particular we have analysed 
the interaction among member countries allowing them, on one hand, to exhibit higher 
or lower level of public debt and, on the other hand, to following or not an explicit fiscal 
rule. After solving the optimization problems, from the results given by the non-
cooperative and cooperative solutions, we have found that for the case of either no 
country adopting fiscal rules or all countries adopting fiscal rules, cooperation is not the 
best solution when monetary shocks are transmitted leading to the “locomotive” effect. 
But for the case of only one country adopting the rule, cooperation is not the best 
solution when the shocks are transmitted leading to the “beggar-thy-neighbour”, and 
the country adopting the fiscal rule exhibits a high level of debt. 
According to our model, the “beggar-thy-neighbour” effect prevails when 
countries are particularly concerned by inflation targeting and output stabilization. And 
we could think that this would be the case for a monetary union following a monetary 
policy rule. Therefore, we could conclude that for EU-27 countries it not would be 
desirable to implement an identical policy response when facing financial shocks and 
the countries with a higher level of debt follow an explicit fiscal rule. 
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APPENDIX 
The macroeconomic model 
                     112121 )( fgyppry                       (1.A) 
                     221212 )( fgyppry                  (2.A) 
                        2121 22
1 yypppr o 


                          (3.A)  
 
From (1.A) to (3.A) we obtain the aggregate demand for each country 
    wEc zprodupw 11111                                             (4.A) 
pzprodwp 1111                                                      (5.A) 
111 prodyn                                                                       (6.A) 
1,11  c
E
c pp                                                                             (7.A) 
211 )1( ppp c                                                               (8.A) 
111 nlu                                                                               (9.A) 
 
From (4.A) to (9.A) we obtain the aggregate supply for each country 
 
The “beggar-thy-neighbour” effect prevails when countries are particularly concerned 
by inflation targeting and output stabilization ( and , in the monetary rule ─ equation 
(3.A) ─  are high enough). 
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Reduced form 
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Independent decision and no fiscal rule in any country 
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Coordinated decision and no fiscal rule in any country 
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Independent decision and fiscal rule in both countries 
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Coordinated decision and fiscal rule in both countries 
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Coordinated decision and fiscal rule only in one country, we assume that country 1 
follows the fiscal rule: 
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Cooperative solution: 
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Values for the empirical application 
 
Beggar-thy-neighbour Locomotive 
 = 0.6          = 0.8  = 0.6          = 0.8 
 = 0.9         = 0.1          = 0.1  = 0.9         = 0.1          = 0.1 
 = 1  = 1 
a = 0.3622 a = 0.9126 
b = 0.2047 b =  0.8349 
c = 0.1338 c =  0.0679 
h = 0.7874 h =  0.9708 
A = 0.7824 A = 0.6727 
B = 0.1944 B = 0.3175 
C = 0.2436 C = 0.3488 
D = 0.0897 D = 0.2718 
 = 1.3                    = 0.5  = 1.3                    = 0.5 
k1 =  0.9 or  k1 = 0.9 k1 =  0.9 or k1 = 0.9 
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